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by ROBERT H. RASCHE
The use of a reserve aggregate as an operating target raises questions about the interest rate effects
of policy actions on the ability of the Federal Reserve to achieve a desired growth in the money stock.
Open market operations affect both reserve aggregates and interest rates. Changes in interest rates, in
turn, influence the portfolio decisions of banks and the public, and are believed by some to be a com-
plicating factor in the achievement of a desired money growth. This article surveys empirical evidence
on the interest rate sensitivity of the money supply, and concludes that this interest elasticity appears
to be extremely low. Hence, this factor should exert a negligible effect on the ability of the Federal
Reserve to influence money stock growth through controlof a reserve aggregate.
N RECENT YEARS there has been considerable
discussion concerning techniques for conducting mon-
etary policy. The traditional practitioners of the art of
policymaking have argued for the use of operating
procedures which focus on “money market conditions.”
At various times this has been construed to mean free
reserves, the Treasury bill rate, the federal funds rate,
or a combination of these.i Alternatively, it has been
argued that the target of monetary policy actions
should be a monetary aggregate, and that this target
can be achieved by control of some reserve aggregate
concept such as the monetary baseY
This article surveys the accumulated empirical evi-
dence on the interest sensitivity of some reserve
multipliers. If these multipliers are highly sensitive to
interest rate changes, then it may be difficult to fin-
plement monetary control through the control of re-
serve aggregates. The available evidence consistently
indicates, however, that the interest sensitivity of vari-
ous multiplier concepts is extremely low. This suggests
that control of monetary aggregates through reserve
control should not be very difficult to implement.3
money stock (Mi), given control of some reserve ag-
gregate concept. The problem can be illustrated by
the equation
M = mR
where “M” is the money stock, “II” is some reserve
aggregate concept, and nnm~~is the appropriate reserve
multiplier.~ Two sources of difficulty can arise in such
a control procedure.
First there can be systematic feedbacks on
through market forces which tend to offset the ex-
pected effect of a change in the reserve aggregate on
the money stock. This influence of the behavior of
reserves on the value of the multiplier can be stated as
m=f(R).
The sources of feedback from changes in nnfl,. to
changes in ne~o~ will vary depending on the choice of
a reserve aggregate concept. If the net source base
concept is used for “R”, the associated multiplier
(m) is
1 +k ____
m — (r—b) (l+t+d) + k
where nnr, and “b” are the ratios of bank reserves and
member bank borrowings to commercial bank deposits,
respectively, “t”, “k” and“d”, respectively, are the ratios
of time deposits, currency held by the public, and
U.S. Government deposits at commercial banks to the
demand deposit component of the money supply.
Therefore, the important behavioral relationships in-
fluencing the stability of the multiplier in the presence
4A number of candidates have been proposed for “R” in-
cluding the monetary base, unborrowed reserves plus cur-
rency, total reserves, unborrowed reserves, and reserves
available to support private deposits. For a discussion of
the relative virtues of many of these, see Richard Davis,
Short-Run Targets for Open Market Operations,” in Open
Market Policies and Operating Procedures — Staff Studies
(Waslfiagton, D.C.: Board of Govemors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 1971), pp. 37-45.
Page 11
Conditions Inhibiting Control of the
Money Stock
The issue examined here is the feasibility of control
of a monetary aggregate such as the narrowly defined
iStephen H. Axibod, “The FOMC Directive as Structured in
the Late 1960’s: Theory and Appraisal,” in Open Market
Policies and Operating Procedures — Staff Studies (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1971), pp. 1-36.
2
For example, see Albert E. Burger, Lionel Kalish HI, and
Christopher T. Bahh, ‘~lt1oneyStock Control and Its Implica-
tions for Monetary Policy,” this Review (October 1971),
pp. 6-22.
~If, however, these multipliers are highly sensitive to interest
rate changes, then accurate monetary control through a
reserve control procedure requires a precise estimate of the
impact of reserve changes on interest rates, in addition to a
precise estimate of the interest elasticity of the reserve
multiplier.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS
of reserve changes are the public’s demand for cur-
rency and time deposits, banks’ demand for excess
reserves and borrowings, and the supply of time
deposits.5
An example of a feedback effect on “m” would be
where there exists a sizable short-run interest elasticity
of demand for excess reserves by commercial banks. In
order to force additional reserves into the banking sys-
tem to expand the money stock, the Federal Reserve
would have to buy Government securities, thus push-
ing short-term interest rates down. If the amount of
excess reserves demanded by banks is very sensitive to
changes in short-term interest rates, this interest rate
movement would induce banks to hold larger quan-
tities of excess reserves. This portfolio shift then offsets
the policy to increase the money stock.
The existence of strong feedback effects on the
reserve multiplier does not mean that monetary con-
trol through reserve aggregates is impossible. The
stronger the feedback, the larger the necessary magni-
tude of the open market operation required to achieve
a given change in the money stock and the larger the
associated variance in short-term interest rates.
The second source of difficulty in this type of mone-
tary control procedure is that the relationship between
the reserve aggregate and the money stock is subject
to random fluctuation. Specifically, we can write
mt=f(Rt) + at
where “ar” is an unknown random disturbance to
“mi”. If such fluctuations are truly random, then in
the long run policymakers should be able to hit the
desired average stock of money quite closely. If this
random component is large, then in a short time pe-
riod, such as one or two months, the average “m”
could deviate considerably from the forecast “m” and
cause a large average error around the desired path
of the money stock.
It can be shown that for a given variance of “at”,
under a control procedure such as that recently pro-
posed by Burger, Kalish, and Babh, the variance of
the actual path of the money stock around the desired
path will depend on the sensitivity of the reserve
5For a detailed discussion of the functional relationship of
the multiplier expression to asset holdings of the nonbank
public, the banking system, and the Treasury, see Albert E.
Burger, The Money Supply Process (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth, 1971), especially chaps. 4-5, and Karl Brunner
and Allan H. Meltzer, “Liquidity Traps for Money, Bank
Credit, and Interest Rates, Journal of Political Economy
(January/February 1968), pp. 1-37.
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multiplier (m) to changes in the reserve aggregate
The smaller the sensitivity of the multiplier, the
smaller will be the variancc of the actual money stock
around the desired money stock
The Nature of Available Evidence
on Multiplier Sensitivity
Over the past decade there has been considerable
empirical research directed at measuring the relation-
ship between the money stock and various reserve ag-
gregates. This work has evolved primarily from at-
tempts to construct econometnc models of basic finan
cml relationships in the U S economy As a by product,
these studies provide information on the interest elas
ticities of the behavioral parameters of the rcserve
multiplier, the existence of which cause feedbacks
~gainst pohcy actions as discussed above
Most of the more detailed studies have worked
with quarterly data, which may be too highly ag-
gregated in time to provide information that policy
makers desire if the reactions of the banking system
and the public are distnbuted over time However
studies using shorter time honzons do exist for some
components of the money supply mechanism, and
these can be used to obtain information on how the
estimated elasticities are likely to change as the horizon
becomes shorter
There are several potential sources of feedback
which will offset the expected impact of a change in
reserve aggregates on the change in the money stock,
Some of the feedback, such as a change in the demand
for currency and time deposits by the nonbank public
as a result of increased economic activity, has been
shown to occur only slowly, and does not cause diffi-
culties for short-run control.7
The troublesome source of changes in the multiplier
relationship is the impact of changes in interest rates on
the behavioral parameters in the multiplier. Changes
in market interest rates and changes in reserves avail-
ableto the banking system cannot be controlled simul-
taneously by the Federal Reserve System. When the
Federal Reserve follows a reserve aggregate operat-
ing procedure, interest rates are affected by changes
in reserves. Under a money market conditions operat-
ing strategy, changes in reserve aggregates come
about as a result of the attempt to achieve certain
°Burger, Kalish, and Bahb, “Money Stock Control.”
7
See David I. Fand, “Some Implications of Money Supply
Analysis,” American Economic Review (May 1967), pp.
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levels of interest rates. Hence, if the goal is to control
money through changes in reserve aggregates, the
major issue is the interest elasticity of the relationship
between the money stock and reserve aggregates.
It will be necessary to distinguish between short-
run, or impact, elasticities of the reserve multiplier
and long-run, or equilibrium, elasticities. The former
include only the impact ‘which comes from the adjust-
ment of economic units to a change in interest rates
within one period of time. Many studies, however,
have indicated that economic units respond to such
changes with a distributed lag; that is, part of the
response takes place in the same period, and the re-
mainder of the response takes place over several pe-
riods following a change in interest rates. The impact,
or short-run, interest elasticity is the percentage change
in the reserve multiplier with respect to a percentage
change in interest rates within the time period in
which the interest rate changes - The equilibrium, or
long-mn, elasticity is the total response of the reserve
multiplier after economic units havehad sufficient time
to adjust to a new portfolio equilibrium.8
In the studies cited below, estimates have been ob-
tained for the interest elasticity of the money stock
for given values of various reserve aggregates. Thus,
the money stock elasticities computed are the interest
elasticities of the reserve multiplier.
Interest Elasticity Estimates From Data
Prior to 1965
Teigen I
An early econometric investigation of the money
supply relationship was that of Ronald Teigen.°His
study does not develop the detailed specifications
which are characteristic of more recent studies. In
particular, the stocks of currency in the hands of the
public and deman&deposits at nonmember banks are
assumed cxogenous.W In addition, Teigcn takes the
quantity of time deposits at member banks and gov-
ernment deposits at member banks as exogenous
variables.”
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Teigen tests the hypothesis that the banking system
takes more than one period to respond to changes in
interest rates, but this hypothesis is rejected for the
post-war data. Thus his impact and equilibrium in-
terest elasticities of the money supply relationship are
equal. His estimated coefficients of elasticity are
0.1950 for the commercial paper rate and — 0.1695
for the discount rate.”
DeLeeuw I
Frank DeLeeuw attempted to obtain more detailed
numerical estimates of behavior in important financial
markets than did Teigen.” In particular, DeLeeuw
separates bank borrowing and excess reserve behavior,
and explicity esthnates functions for currency demand
and time deposit demand at commercial banks by
the nonbank public.
The interest elasticity estimates from this study are
summarized in Table I. In all cases the absolute value
of the long-mn elasticities are less than one, and the
short-run elasticities never exceed 0.2 in absolute value.
The available data do not permit reconstruction of
the interest elasticities of excess reserves. However,
DeLeeuw did publish the results of a computation of
the implicit interest elasdeities of the money-reserve
determining the value of the elasticity of the relationship,
these exogenous variables are kept fixed at some point,
conventionally their mean value for the sample period.
Hence, the computations implicitly assume positive interest
rate responses for the public’s currency demand and the
supply of demand deposits by nonmember banks, which
are equal to the interest rate response of demand deposits
supplied by member banks. For nonmember banks, the as-
sumption probably does not seriously affect the analysis. On
the other hand, the public’s currency demand is usually
found to have a zero, or slightly negative, interest elasticity,
at least in the long run. If the true interest elasticity of
currency demand is zero, then the bias introduced by the
constant ratio of currency to money stock is indeterminate.
On the one hand, the direct effect of increased currency
in the hands of the public as demand deposits supplied by
banks increase biases the interest elasticity of the money
supply upward. On the other hand, the indirect effect that
the assumed increase in currency withdraws reserves from
the banking system causes the model to understate the de-
sired amount of deposit expansion. Since the magnitudes
involved are small, the net bias should not be substantial.
“These variables do not explicitly appear in his model. How-
ever, the reserve aggregate which he uses is unborrowed
reserves available to support private demand deposits. Later
studies use more broadly defined aggregates such as Un-
borrowed reserves, or unborrowed reserves plus currency.
To make the studies comparable, the model must be re-
formulated with time deposits at member banks and gov-




Teigen, “Demand and Supply Functions,” p. 502.
~Frank DeLeeuw, “A Model of Financial Behavior,” in The
I3rookingc Quarterly Econometric Model of the United
States, ed. James S. Duesenberry et nI. (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1965), chap. 13.
8For a discussion of impact versus long-run responses, see
Arthur S. Goldberger, Impact Multipliers and Dynamic Prop-
cities of the Klein-Goldberger Model (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1959).
°Ronald L. Teigen, “Demand and Supply Functions for
Money in the United States: Some Structural Estimates,”
Econometrica (October 1964), pp. 476-509.
~~Jt is necessary to distinguish here between the construction
of the model from historical data, and the use of the model
to determine interest elasticities. In the construction of the
model, the ratio of currency to demand deposits at member
banks and the ratio of demand deposits at nonmember
banks to those at member banks are in fact exogenous
variables which vary from one observation to the next. InFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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relationship derived from the estimated borrowings
and excess reserves functions. In this computation, he
takes the ratios of currency, time deposits, U.S. Gov-
ernment deposits, and nonmember bank demand de-
posits to money stock as constant. Thus the biases
which were introduced into Teigen’s computations are
again present here. DeLecuw’s reserve aggregate is
nonborrowed reserves plus currency in the hands of
the public. His estimated long-run elasticities, valued
at the sample means, are 0,172 and —0.214 for the
Treasury bill rate and the discount rate, respectively.
When valued in 1962 (the end of his sample period)
these elasticities are 0.245 and — 0.348, respectively.”
These numbers seem quite compatible with those
obtained by Teigen for approximately the same sample
period. However, DeLeeuw finds that the entire ad-
justment of banks to portfolio changes takes place
only gradually over time, and his impact elasticities
for borrowings are only about one-fourth of the equi-
librium values. This suggests that if the data were
available to compute the short-run elasticity for the
money supply relationship, the estimates over a one-
quarter period would be considerably lower than
those obtained by Teigen.
The currency and time deposit demand equations
which DeLeeuw incorporates into the above coinputa-
tions are almost completely insensitive to interest rate
changes over a one-quarter horizon. This implies that
over a one-quarter horizon changes in reserves avail-
able to support private demand deposits, which are




time deposit dem md are negligible Thus it is highly
probable that the assumptions of eonstint currency/
money stock or time deposit/moncy stock rstios result
in a net upward bias in the computed inteicst elastic
ity of the money supply rclationship
DeLeeuw II
In a subsequent study for the Brookmgs model
DeLeeuw produced a condensed model of financial
behavior in which the excess reserve and borrowings
cquitions were ‘iggrcgited into a single function to
uxplain free reserves lit In that study estimates of the
interest elasticity of the money supply relationship
are not provided However, using the free reserve
intcrest rate coefficientestimates and information given
in the earlier study It is possible to replicate the
computations of the largei model il~
The estimated impact elasticities at the sample
means are 0037 for the Treasury bill rate, and —0 046
for the discount rate 17 The correspondmg long run
elasticities are 0096 and —0 118 respectively The ab-
solute values are lower by a factor of almost fifty
percent from the values obtained in the earlier study,
even though the data and the sample period have
reniamed essentially unchanged
It is likely that some downward bias has been in
troduced into these estimates by aggregating excess
rcscrves and borrowings mto free reserves in the esti-
mation of the model From the information presented
in the first study, it is not possible to aggregate the
interest elasticities of these two components. However,
the early work suggests that the response of banks to
a disequilibrium in borrowings from the Federal Re-
serve is much faster than the response to a similar
situation with respect to excess reserves.
Gold/eM
The most detailed study of financial markets is
found in the work of Stephen Goldfeld.iT In this
study, equations are specified for both the demand for
excess reserves and the demand for borrowings from
the Federal Reserve System. Separate equations are
estimated for country banks and city banks.
The Goldfeld results suggest verylarge (in absolute
value) interest elasticities for the borrowings equations
~Frank DeLeeuw, “A Condensed Model of Financial Be-
havior,” in The Iirookings Model: Some Further Results,




DeLeeuw, “A Model of Financial Behavior.”




Stephen M. Goldfeld, Commercial Bank Behavior and Eco-
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relative to those found by DeLeeuw. There do not
appear to be large differences in the impact elasticities
of borrowings across the bank classes, but the speed
of adjustment to interest rate changes is much slower
for borrowings by country banks than for city banks.
This is reflected in the lower impact elasticities and
the higher equilibrium elasticities for the country
banks than the corresponding numbers for the city
banks.
The excess reserve interest elasticities reported by
Goldfeld are negligible, particularly when compared
with the borrowings elasticities. In addition, he finds
that banks respond quite quickly to disequilibrium in
excess reserve holdings. Thus, the long-run elasticities
for excess reserve demand are not much different from
the impact elasticities, particularly for city banks.
This result is similar to that of the Teigen study where
no evidence of a distributed lag in bank response
was found.
Goldfeld reports interest elasticities of a money sup-
ply relationship comparable to that derived by both
Teigen and DeLeeuw. The impact elasticities, with
respect to the Treasury bill rate and the discount
rate in this function, 0.042 and —0.029, respectively,
are derived from the elasticities reported in Table II.
The corresponding long-run elasticities are 0.222 and
_O.O76.Th These results are quite close to the values
reported by both Teigen and DcLeeuw for the Treas-
ury bill rate, but considerably below the estimates for
the discount rate in the other studies.
The sources of the differences are fairly conspicuous.
In Teigen’s study, where there is no disaggregation
of excess reserves from borrowings, the Treasury bill
rate and the discount rate appear only as the differ-
ential between the two rates. Hence the regression
coefficient of the discount rate is constrained to have
the same absolute value, but with the opposite sign
from that of the bill rate. Since the mean of the dis-
count rate for the sample period is slightly larger than
that of the bill rate, the computed coefficient of elas-
ticity of the discount rate is, in effect, constrained to
be slightly smaller in absolute value than that of the
bill rate. DeLeeuw constrains this excess reserve
specification to include only the differential between
the bill rate and the discount rate. Given the con-
straints that are imposed in the estimation of the
Teigen and DeLeeuw studies~it would seem reason-
able to conclude that the Goldfeld estimate of the
response of the money supply relationship to discount
rate changes is more reliable for this period.
‘°Ibid.,p. 191.
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There seem to be no major discrepancies in the
estimated long-run responsiveness of the money sup-
ply to changes in the bill rate, but considerable vari-
ance exists among the short-run elasticity estimates,
The most uncertain issue, on the basis of the evidence
reviewed so far, is the source of the interest elasticity.
Goldfeld suggests that the source is bank borrowing
behavior, DeLeeuw suggests that it is bank behavior
with respect to excess reserves, and Teigen does not
attempt to discriminate between the two.
Gold/eld andKane
There exists an additional study by Goldfeld and
Kane which provides some independent information
on the question of the interest elasticity of bank bor-
rowings from the Federal Reserve.20 This study is
based on weekly data from the period July 1953 to
December 1963 and disaggregates banks into four
classes — New York City, Chicago, Other Reserve City,
and Country banks. They find that the estimated
short-mn (one week) Treasury bill rate elasticities
range from a high of 0.56 for New York City banks
to a low of 0.08 for Chicago banks. When aggregated
over all classes of banks, the short-run interest elas-
20
Stephen M. Coldfeld and Edward J. Kane, “The Determin-
ants of Member-Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study,”
Journal of Finance (September i966), pp. 499-514, aod
Stephen M. Coldfeld, “An Extension of the Monetary
Sector,” in The Brookingr Model: Some Further Results, ed.
James S. Duesenberry et al. (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1969), pp. 317-360.
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ticity for the banking system as a whole is found to be
0.21. Their reported long-run interest elasticities of
borrowings range from 2.8 to 3921
These estimates seem consistent with the results of
the quarterly study by Goldfeld and tend to add to
the uncertainty of the high excess reserve and low bor-
rowings elasticities reported by DeLeeuw. The only
difficulty in reconciling the weekly estimates with the
quarterly work of Goldfeld is the implied definition of
long run. In the quarterly study, the long run is
achieved only after serveral quarters have elapsed. In
the weekly study, the implied long run is a period
of several weeks. The possibility remains that long run
in the two studies has two different meanings. How-
ever, it seems safe to conclude that borrowing behavior
of banks is an important source of interest elasticity
of the money supply relationship when the Treasury
bill rate changes and the discount rate remains
constant.
TeigenII
A quarterly study which deals with the period of
the 1950s through the early 1960s is that of Teigen.22
The study contains supply elasticities only for the
demand deposit component of the money supply.
The results for the elasticity of the discount rate are
not very different from those reported by Coldfcld,
but the elasticity of the Treasury bifi rate is consid-
erably lower than the results obtained by Coldfeld,
DeLeeuw and Teigen’s earlier results.
Brunnerand Meltzer
Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer have estimated the
interest elasticity of the money supply relationship
using annual data over a sample period including the
interwar and post-war periods.23 In the two stage
least-squares estimates of their “nonlinear” money sup-
ply hypothesis, they find that the elasticity of the
money supply function with respect to the adjusted
monetary base is insignificantly different from one.
Therefore, the interest elasticities of this function can
be interpreted as interest elasticities of the reserve
multiplier. Their estimate of the Treasury bill rate
elasticity is 0.66 and the estimate of the discount rate
elasticity is — 0.31.24 Since there are no lagged varia-
t
tGoldfeld and Kane, “The Determinants of Member-Bank
Borrowing: An Econometric Study,” p. 512.
22
RonaJd L. Teigen, “An Aggregated Quarterly Model of the
U.S. Monetary Sector, 1953-1964,” in Targets and Indicators
of Monetary Policy, ed. Karl Brunner (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 175-218. 23
Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Some Further In-
vestigations of Demand and Supply Functions for Money,”
Journal of Finance (May 1964), pp. 240-283. 2~Ibid.,p. 277.
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bles in the equation these estimates can be compared
with the equilibrium elasticities derived from the
studies which used shorter time intervals Both elas-
ticities appear to differ from the implied equilibrium
values of the quarterly studies by a factor of over two.
Given the many difficulties in estimating distributed
lag effects from time series data, such inconsistencies
are not surprising.
Estimates from Data Including
Post-1965 Period
The shortcoming of the studies discussed so far is
that they are based on data generated in the 195Os
and early l960s. During the 1960s there were many
cli inges in the environment in which the banking
system operated which could have significantly altered
(and presumably increased) the interest elasticity of
themoney supply relationship. These changes included
the evolution of an active mirket for large negotiable
certificates of deposit, the involvement of large banks
in the Eurodollar market through borrowings from (or
lending to) their foreign subsidiaries, and the en-
tr met of banks into the commercial paper market
through parent one bank holding companies
Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain empirical cvi
dence on many of these innovations since they were
effectively legislated out of existence before enough
data were generated to assess their effects, The im-
pact of the CD market can be assessed, along with
the responsiveness of the banking system in terms of
free reserves in the 1960s, through the quarterly finan-
cial model in the M.P.S. model.25 In addition, esti-
mates of the interest elasticity of the money supply-
reserve relationship on a monthlybasis can be obtained
from a financial market model developed by Thomas
Thomson and James Pierce.2”
Evaluation of Quarterly
Money Supply Elasticities
The quarterly M,P.S. model contains a financial
sector which includes detailed specifications of the
commercial loan market and the mortgage market, as
well as specifications dealing with bank and nonbank
behavior with respect to holdings of currency, time
deposits and free reserves. The estimated elasticities
for the latter set of functions are tabulated in Table
2STMs model is the publicly available version which de-
veloped out of the Federal Reserve - M.I.T. - Pennsylvania
econometric model project.
26
Thomas D. Thomson and James L. Pierce, “A Monthly
Econometric Model of the Financial Sector” (A paper pre-
sented at the May 1971 meeting of the Federal Reserve
System Committee on Financial Analysis).
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table ill
interest Elasfi sties of Various Fwyttrons
in the hIP S. ModS
Impact Eoplthuum
Spec ficcilima tiact ty ~lastialy
Currency Den,and
Treasury 81! Rate 0037 026
Non-CD Tieta Depot I Demand
‘lime Deposit Rate 3 29
S&L-’---Mu%, Saw Bk Rate 2 20
Treasury Btfl *ate 15 1 4
CD Demand 1969 Veluesj
Treasury BR! Rate 614 6 4




1945 Values 2 99 642
1969 VeIns —395 347
Discevet Ru e
1945 VeIns 32
19*9 VoIces 348 746
Sapply *1 CDt by Bepks 11959 VaIue4
CD Rate 106 —1~4
Treat ry Bull Rate 9B 93
III. Both the CD demand and supply functions, which
did not exist in the earlier studies, assume that the
full response to an interest rate change takes place
within one quarter. Thus the impact and equilibrium
elasticities are equal.
The CD demand function, in particular, indicates
a highly sensitive response to interest rate changes,
which is consistent with casual impressions of the
nature of the CD market. However, these estimates
are drawn from a considerably smaller sample than
that for the rest of the specifications, and therefore
there is less certainty about the stability of the func-
tions over time.
The estimates for the currency demand equation
and the demand equation for non-CD time deposits
tend to confirm the DeLeeuw and Goldfeld results of
extremely low impact elasticities. The time deposit
function does suggest higher long-run elasticities than
had been previously estimated. This appears attributa-
ble, in part, to the evolution of special forms of time
deposit accounts, such as small consumer-type CDs,
during the late 1960s.27
The M,P,S. model does not distinguish between
excess reserves and borrowings of member banks, but
does estimate a relationship between the Treasury bill
rate, the discount rate, and free reserves. No con-
straints are applied to the coefficients of the two rates.
In Table III, both the impact and the equilibrium
27
The estimated function allows for a change in structure
during the early 1980s, which indicates that the interest
elasticities in the latter part of the sample period are about
fifty percent higher than those estimated for the first part
of the sample period.
elasticities of this function are considerably higher
than those estimated in the earlier studies. This is
partially due to the fact that the estimated function
is linear, and therefore the value of the elasticity co-
efficient is not constant at all points along the func-
tion. Evaluation of the elasticity coefficient at the very
high values of interest rates in 1969 gives estimates of
the impact and equilibrium Treasury bill rate elastici-
ties which are fifty and twenty-five percent higher,
respectively, than the values at 1965 interest rate
levels. Even after accounting for the higher levels of
interest rates in the late 1960s, it appears that differ-
ences in specifications and/or differences in sample
periods have produced higher interest rate elasticity
estimates for the free reserve relationship than had
previously been found.
Simulation experiments were performed with the
M.P.S. model which permitted relaxation of restrictions
under which interest elasticities of the money supply
relationship were computed in the studies discussed
above. First, in addition to the impact elasticities, the
pattern of response of the money stock over time to a
maintained change in the Treasury bill rate was com-
puted. The simulations were continued for eight quar-
ters, after which the computed elasticities settled
down at close to the equilibrium values.
Second, the response of the demand for currency
and the demand for time deposits to the changes in
interest rates can be included or excluded from the
computation of the elasticities. Time deposit demand
is split into large negotiable certificates of deposit
and other time deposits. The inclusion of the currency
and time deposit responses in the simulation is analo-
gous to a controlled experiment in which the nonbank
private sector demand for bank demand deposits is
shifted once and maintained in its new position. This
shift is allowed to occur without any effect on the
demand functions for time deposits or currency. This
shift generates an initial change in interest rates. The
changes in the money stock, which are observed over
time, are the result of the interest rate induced port-
folio shifts by banks and the nonbank public, and
they trace out the interest elasticity of the money sup-
ply relationship over various time intervals. Finally,
elasticities are computed for both demand deposits
and the M5 money stock concept.
The estimated elasticities from three sets of simu-
lations are presented in Table IV. These computations
are generated under the assumption that the Federal
Reserve would not impose a Regulation Q constraint
which would prevent banks from offering new CDs
at competitive rates.
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If such constraints were effective, increases in the
Treasury bill rate would cause a shift in the demand
for CDs. At the constrained new issue rate for CDs
the public would not renew outstanding certificates as
they matured. Over time the stock of CDs would
decline, and there could be a sizable reduction in the
ratio of time deposits to demand deposits. The change
in this ratio would, in turn, cause a fluctuation in the
reserve multiplier. The observed result would also he
highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the Treas-
ury bill rate relative to the Regulation Q ceiling, and
the historical pattern of Regulation Q restraint.
In the first section of Table IV, the interest elastici-
ties include the interest rate induced reactions in the
public’s demand for currency, large certificates of de-
posit as well as other time deposits, and the interest
elasticity of the commercial banking sector’s supply
function for large certificates of deposit. The interest
elasticity of M1 is consistently smaller than the inter-
est elasticity of the demand deposit component. This
is because the model indicates a small negative re-
sponse of the demand for currency to changes in inter-
est rates. Hence, as interest rates increase and the
amount of bank deposits available to the economy
expands, there is an offsetting movement in currency
balances outstanding.
The exclusion of the nonbank private sector’s de-
mand for currency and time deposits other than large
certificates of deposit lowers the interest elasticity of
the money supply relationship.28 This is because a
rise (fall) in interest rates decreases (increases) the
quantity demanded of both of these assets. This rela-
tionship is straightforward in the case of currency. For
time deposits the expected equilibrium responsewould
be for a large quantity of time deposits to be de-
manded with higher levels of all interest rates. The
model postulates, however, that the rate which banks
offer on non-CD time deposits responds quite slug-
gishly to changes in market interest rates. Thus the
short-run effect is for disintermediation away from
commercial bank time deposits. If the elasticity pat-
terns were computed over a longer time horizon, the
elasticities in the first experiment would eventually
become smaller than those for the second experiment.
In all cases the impact elasticities are essentially the
same size.
These results can be compared with those from
earlier empirical studies which do not include the CD
25This exclusion of currency and time deposit demand allows
these demand functions to shift in such a way that the
quantity demanded at the new Treasury bill rate is exactly
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quarterly econometric model can be carried out on a
monthly basis using the financial market model of
Pierce and Thompson. The results over an eighteen
month period are presented in Table V. In this model,
demand for currency by the public is specified to be
completely interest inelastic, so the assumptions un-
derlying the calculations of sections B and C of Table
IV are identical to the assumptions made for the
right-hand column of Table V. The analogy to section
Ao fTable IV is presented in the left-hand column of
Table V.
The implication of the monthly model is that the
money stock — reserve relationship is slightly more
elastic in the short run than the various quarterly
estimates imply The implied impact elasticity (over
a one-month period in this case) is about 0.15. The
average elasticity over this first twelve months is
estimated at about 0.25, or about one-third more than
the estimate over the corresponding four-quarter hori-
zon from the M.P.S. model. After eighteen months
have elapsed the elasticity values reflect the long-mn,
or equilibrium, values. This horizon agrees reasonably
well with the horizon of the M.P.S. model.
Conclusions
It is difficult to draw a finely defined set of conclu-
sions from the set of studies which have been ex-
amined. There exists a range of elasticity estimates
among these studies which cannot be reconciled with
the information which is readily available at the
present time.
However, while a single point cannot be estab-
lished as the most probable value for the interest
elasticity of the money supply, it appears that the
studies do provide information which can be of value
in policy discussions concerning the control of the
money stock A broad, hut valuable conclusion is that
the interest elasticity of the money supply during the
sample period of these studies appears to be ex-
tremely low It seems appropriate to conclude with
almost complete certainty that the long-run elasticity
during this period was less than 0.5 and that the
impact elasticity (one quarter) was probably no
greater than 0.10 to 0.15. All these elasticities are
relevant for policy actions which result in changes in
the Treasury bill rate, while leaving the discount rate
unchanged.
For the class of policy actions which simultaneously
alters the Treasury bill rate and the discount rate by
the same amount from an initial position where the
t~voare approximately equal, it is the sum of the
interest elasticities of the money supply which is rele-
Table V
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vant. Two of the studies suggest that the elasticity
with respect to the discount rate is slightly smaller
than that with respect to the bill rate. The estimation
of these relationships involves constraints on parame-
ters, and hence, is not a valid test of the hypothesis
that the two elasticities are significantly different. In
the Goldfeld study, where there are no constraints
imposed on the estimated parameters, the estimated
coefficient of elasticity for the discount rate is con-
siderably smaller in absolute value thauii that of the
bill rate. Therefore, it would appear that while the
interest elasticity of the money supply relationship
is likely to be smaller when both rates are changed
simultaneously, it is almost certain that the coefficient
of elasticity will remain positive. Furthermore, the
elasticity under such a policy probably does not exceed
one-half to two-thirds of the interest elasticity under
a policy of keeping the discount rate fixed.
The available evidence suggests quite conclusively
that the short-run feedbacks through interest rate
changes, which would be generated by policy changes
in reserve aggregates, are very weak and should cause
little, if any, difficulty for the implementation of policy
actions aimed at controlling the money stock through
the control of a reserve aggregate. Of course, the size
of random fluctuations in the reserve multiplier re-
mains a major factor in determining the size of devia-
tions of the money stock from its targeted value.
An issue which remains to be investigated is the size
of the variance of the multipliers associated with
various reserve concepts.
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